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I N T H E SUPREME COURT 
0 F THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
SUSAN RACE, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
-vs-
ROBERT WAYNE RACE, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
Case No. 19146 
BRIEF OF APPELI.ANT 
I. 
NATIJRE OF THE CASE 
This is a divorce action, filed on or about August 1, 1980, 
fran which the appellant appeals the final Supplemental Order and 
Judgpient to Decree of Divorce, dated March 16, 1983 , which made 
part of said order, the Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law and Amended Decree of Divorce, previously entered by the 
court on December 14, 1981. 
6. 
the division of property of the parties, thereby materially 
prejudicing the appellant. 
G. That the Divorce Decree and the property settlement 
contained therein is inequitable. 
IV. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant and respondent were husband and wife, having been 
married on the 21st day of February, 1973. At the time of the 
marriage, appellant had t= minor children, namely Tamara, born 
August 28, 1965, and Jeffrey, born November 13, 1970, a third 
child having died on January 4, 1973. The parties gave birth to 
a child, Sharon, on September 17, 1973. Subsequent to the 
marriage, the respondent adopted the aforementioned minor 
children, Tamara and Jeffrey. 
A Canplaint for Divorce was filed by the appellant on or 
about August 1, 1980 and the parties separated on or about 
January 1, 1981, at which time the respondent moved frum the 
residence of the parties. Subsequently, the respondent was 
charged by the state of Utah with the crime of incest against the 
eldest daughter of the parties, Tamara, in criminal number 81 L'RS 
109, for which said crime, respondent served ninety l90J days in 
the Salt Lake County Jail in 1982. The minor child, Tarr1cir.i, ·,,,.:is 
9. 
placed in the custody of the Juvenile Court for the State of 
Utah, case no. 343584. 
In March, 1981, as a result of the appellant's discovery of 
the incestu:>us relationship between respondent and the minor 
child, Tamara, and the appellant's fears that respondent had 
taken sexual liberties with another minor child, Sharon, 
appellant moved with the minor children frcxn the hcxne of the 
parties to the state of California. See, Transcript of Trial 
( 10-1-81) pages 3-5. 
A hearing was held on the 30th day of April, 1981, before 
the Honorable G. Hal Taylor, at which time the trial court 
a...arded temporary child support to the appellant in the sum of 
$500.00 per month, and ordered that a child custcxly evaluation 
and visitation evaluation be performed on the parties. Various 
further hearings were held by the court, which resulted in the 
appellant obtaining a judgment against the respondent for 
tanporary child support arrearages in the sum of $1,500.00, and 
which resulted in the appellant being held in contempt of the 
lower court for her failure to appear and bring the children 
betore the trial court. 
The first trial in the above matter came before the court on 
October 1, 1981, the Honorable Bryant H. Croft, Judge presiding. 
At this time, the appellant was residing in the state of 
\'ashingtun with the minor children, and, due to her fears with 
10. 
regard to the children, the appellant did not appear at the 
trial, but was represented by counsel, Lynn P. Heward. The 
respondent appeared in person and was represented by counsel, 
Jimi Mitsunaga. 
'Ihe issues of child custody, support, division of property 
and division of debts were in issue at the time of the first 
trial on the matter. In chambers, prior to trial, appellant's 
counsel moved the trial court to adnit and rule on several 
Affidavits in his possession, which were made by persons that 
were outside of the state of Utah and unable to attend the trial. 
See, Transcript of Trial, (10-1-81) page 1, lines 18-22. These 
Affidavits were ruled inadnissible by the trial court, the lower 
court stating that it not accept the Affidavits as evidence 
in the case to prove the allegations of her (appellant's) 
Canplaint, nor the court accept hearsay evidence that was 
not properly acinissible under the rules. See, Transcript of 
Trial, (10-1-81) page 2, lines 15-19. These Affidavits were 
supportive of the appellant's reasons for removing the children 
from the state of Utah and the appellant's reluctance to return 
to the state, and went to the issues of child custody, 
visitation, support and property division. 
The respondent was called by appellant's counsel, and was 
questioned as to what funds each party brought into the marriage 
11. 
and contributed to the purchase of the real property of the 
parties, see, Transcript of Trial, (10-1-81) pages 18-21, the 
debts incurred by the parties during the marriage and the 
respondent's filing of a Chapter XIII bankruptcy, see Transcript 
of Trial, (10-1-81) page 55, lines 12-25, pages 60-63. In 
addition, appellant called Dr. Lynn Anderson of the Division of 
Family Services, to testify with regard to the respondent's 
incestuous relations with his daughter, Tamara, see Transcript of 
Trial, (10-1-81) page 33, lines 4-7, her opinion with regard to 
visitation, see Transcript of Trial, (10-1-81), page 38, lines 
12-15, and appellant's fitness as a parent to the children, see 
Transcript of Trial (10-1-81) page 38, lines 19-24. 
After consideration of the evidence, a divorce was granted 
to each party, as contained in the amended Decree of Divorce. 
The trial court again ordered that a custody evaluation be 
performed in Utah and in the state of Washington where the 
appellant was residing, but reserved any final ruling with regard 
to custody, visitation, or child support. In addition, the court 
reaffirmed the appellant's judg;nent against the respondent for 
$1,500.00 for child support arrearages, and granted appellant an 
additional judgftlent in the sum of $166.67 for child support 
arrearages, but stayed execution on the same, pending the 
scheduling of a visitation program. As child support had been 
by a prior court order on August 10, 1981, the trial court 
12. 
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Children's Hospital and that a reasonable visitation should be 
integrated into that therapy when circunstances became 
appropriate in the opinion of the professionals at said 
institution. In addition, the respondent was not ordered to pay 
any child support lll1til a visitation program had been developed 
the respondent and the minor children, at which time the 
respondent was ordered to pay the sum of $50.00 per month, per 
child. The trial court refused to hear any argunent with regard 
to the question of whether the debts listed in the respondent's 
bankruptcy schedule, which were ordered to be paid from the sale 
of the home, were marital debts or personal debts, or whether 
said obligations had been reimbursed to respondent from various 
health insurance companies or respondent's 6Dployer. In 
addition, the court refused to hear any further argunent with 
regard to the division of the proceeds or equity from the sale of 
the home or the question of granting a homestead exemption in 
favor of the appellant. After having previously ordered that 
appellant could sul::mit Interrogatories to the respondent for the 
purpose of detennining the nature of the debts listed in 
respondent's bankruptcy, the court upheld the respondent's 
objections to said Interrogatories, holding that respondent 
needn' t answer the same. 
15. 
v. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISICN AS 'ID THE 
DIVISION OF AND CONSIDERATION OF THE 
PROCEE:ffi FRa--1 THE SALE OF THE REAL PROPERIY 
OF THE PARTIES WAS A MISAPPLICATION OF THE 
LAW AND AN ABUSE OF DISCRETICN 
(A) 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS 
DISCRETION IN FAILING 'ID RECOGNIZE 
WHAT DEBTS THE RESPCNDENT WAS DIS-
CHARGING IN HIS FEDERAL BANKRIJPI'CY 
PROCEEDING, AND IN SUSTAINING THE 
RESPONDENT'S OBJECTIONS 'ID APPELIANT' S 
INTERRcx;A'IDRIES WITH RESPECT 'ID 
RESPONDENT'S BANKRIJPI'CY 
Subsequent to the initiation of the above divorce acticn, 
the respondent filed a Chapter XIII Bankruptcy in the Federal 
Bankruptcy Court. That bankruptcy proceeding was later corwerted 
into a Chapter VII Bankruptcy prior to the final divorce herein. 
At the first trial on the matter on October 1, 1981, the trial 
court ordered that the real property of the parties be awarded 
solely to the respondent, and that the respondent receive all 
title and possession thereto. While the court did make 
that award contingent upon certain dispositions of the funds, as 
previously indicated, sole title was av.iarded to respondent, who 
16. 
was, at that time, still in a Chapter XI II Bankruptcy. After the 
respondent converted the Chapter XIII Bankruptcy to a Chapter VII 
Bankruptcy, the Federal Bankruptcy Court, Anna Drake as Trustee, 
took possession of the real property of the parties and sold the 
same. As the trial court had awarded title in the respondent, 
the appellant had absolutely no input nor impact on the sale, the 
property going into the hands of the Bankruptcy Court, nor any 
right to a homestead exanption in the Bankruptcy Court. As far 
as the Bankruptcy Court and the Trustee in Bankruptcy were 
concerned, the appellant had no interest in the hane at the time, 
due to the District Court's prior order awarding title to 
respondent. Obviously, this was not the case, nor was it the 
intention of the trial court. However, this turn of events 
placed the appellant in an inequitable position, which could be 
alleviated only by a further order of the trial court and not 
through the Federal Bankruptcy Court. Unfortunately, and to the 
appellant's prejudice, the trial court failed to recognize this 
issue. 
At the initial trial on the matter, the respondent testified 
that all of the debts listed in the bankruptcy list ot creditors 
were marital debts, and testifiea that all of the debts listed in 
his financial declaration, sutmitted to the court, were the same 
as those listed on the bankruptcy list of creditors. See 
Transcript of Trial, (10-1-81) page 61, line 22, through page 62, 
17. 
1 ine 16, and page 63, lines 13-16. Appellant 1.x:>uld ask this 
Court, as it has asked the trial court, to take notice that the 
debts listed on the financial declaration suhnitted by the 
respondent, and the debts listed on the respondent's bankruptcy 
list of creditors, are not identical. See, Defendant's Financial 
Declaration, Attachnent "B", Unsecured Debts, designated as 
Exhibit 1 , and incorporated herein by reference, and see 
Menorandum of Points and Authorities relevant to the hanestead 
exemption, dated April 16, 1982, page 2, paragraph 10. There are 
various creditors listed on the respondent's Chapter XIII list of 
creditors that were not listed on respondent's financial 
declaration. At various times during the trial and the many 
hearings before the Honorable Judge Croft, the trial court and 
the appellant inquired into the nature of the debts listed by the 
respondent in his bankruptcy proceeding. In fact, the trial 
court ordered that further evidence should be had into the nature 
of the debts, and that Interrogatories be sutinitted to discover 
whether the particular debts listed were marital, individual, or 
debts which occurred after the separation of the parties. In 
addition, there was evidence to the effect that many of the debts 
which had been listed on the bankruptcy schedule had been debts 
for which the respondent had been reimbursed, having been paid to 
the resp;ndent by insurance companies and respondent's enployer, 
18. 
but which ranained tmpaid by the resp:indent, the resp:indent 
keeping the money and not satisfying those obligations. After 
Interrogatories were subnitted by the appellant through her first 
cotmsel, Lynn P. Hei.ard, and again through her second cotmsel, 
Kellie F. Williams, with regard to the status, existence of, and 
payments of those debts, no answers were forthcoming fran the 
respondent. The trial court, in the final hearing on February 4, 
1983, washed its hands of the matter by stating that the matter 
had been decided, and that the Interrogatories need not be 
answered. Again, this order came after the trial court had 
specifically ordered resp:indent's cotmsel to furnish the court 
with respondent's bankruptcy schedule and an audit to the court 
by respective cotmsel as to the origin and/ or payment of those 
debts. See, Transcript of Hearing (8-12-82) page 11, line 25 
through page 12, line 8, and pages 14-15, and Transcript of 
Hearing (9-27-82) page 13, lines 6-25, and page 14, lines 1-5. 
While on the one hand the trial court had recomnended and ordered 
that inquiries be made into the origin of those debts and stated 
that "I "-Ould say toough that if Mr. Race, after the court 
proceedings, went out, and even after the separation, went out 
and incurred sane additional obligations that had nothing to do 
with the marriage relationship, and then included those debts in 
his schedules, that they should not be considered for the 
purposes of determining how much, if anything, is going to be 
19. 
left over to be divided" [fran the equity in the real property]. 
See Transcript of Hearing (8-12-22) page 11, lines 13-20. In 
addition, the ccurt stated that " •. other than the payment of 
the debts that were outstanding at the time of the separation, 
Mrs. Hunter should not have to be liable for her share of any 
remainder of Mr. Race's debts that were not considered to be or 
cculd not be considered debts of the marriage." See Transcript 
of Hearing (8-12-82) page 10, line 22 through page 11, line 2. 
As previously stated, each time atttllipteo to discover 
the status of those debts, Lhrougt, interr...igator ies and M::>tions to 
Canpel, respondent refused to ccoperate, and in the end, trial 
court, still being uninformed as to the status of those debts, 
and not having any further evidence, found that the matter had 
been decided, and that the appellant had no recourse. See 
Transcript of Hearing (2-4-83) page 8, lines 23-24. 
The home of the parties was sold by the Trustee in 
Bankruptcy for the sum of $110,000.00, the net amount owing to 
the Trustee being $28,915.48, together with interest at the rate 
of 7% per annum, payable at the rate of $192.37 per month for ten 
years with a balloon payment of $24, 810. 00 due June 20 , 1992. 
See, Affidavit of Anna W. Drake dated Febn..,.11 J, Tre 
actual claims filed by the respondent toLi.Llled vl4,994.0l, and 
the Trustee anticipates adninistrative claims in the sum of 
$5,000.00, reducing the proceeds fran the sale of the hane to, 
20. 
approximately, $8,921.39. Said proceeds and possible equity to 
be divided between the partif's, but be inf unavailabl( to de 
parties until the balloon is made m June 20, 1992, and 
all creditors are paid. 
The result of the confusion, misunderstanding, and the 
failure of the appellant and the trial court to discover the 
status of the debts of respondent, when they were incurred, and 
whether or not they were reimbursed to respondent, prejudiced the 
appellant materially. The appellant's share in the equity of the 
hane, if any becanes available, has been reduced inequitably and 
unjustly. The trial court could have alleviated the injustice of 
the property division by recognizing that a portion of the 
proceeds from the sale of the tia..e we>.:> uuc cne respondent's, but 
solely the property of the a.,!Jellai.i:, ana could have created a 
deference in the appellant entitling her to inrnediate payment by 
the bankruptcy court of any amount found to be hers solely. As 
the court had ordered that the home was titled solely in the 
respondent, however, and that all of respondent's creditors had 
to be paid, the appellant remains without recourse. Again, at 
the time of the final hearing, the court was informed that, by 
his order, a deference could be created in the appellant in the 
eyes of the bankruptcy court. The trial court refused to do so, 
in a blatant abuse of discretion. While in the prior hearing 
held on August 12, 1982, the court hao stated ". . . the amount of 
21. 
mooey [from the sale of the hane] <MJUld seem to me ought to be 
used to pay off the obligations that the couple owed at the time 
of their separation. \.hether or not Mr. Race has other 
obligations included in his schedules, I don't know." See 
Transcript of Hearing (8-12-82) page 8, lines 20-24. The trial 
court still did not know at the final hearinp ""' FPhruary 4, 
1983, ..Oen it stated that the matter had been decided. 
Presently, the Trustee in Bankruptcy, Anna Drake, is 
holding, and will not disperse any funds In The Matter of Robert 
Wayne Race, tb. 81-01923, until the present divorce appeal has 
been detenn ined by the court. See, Affidavit of Trustee, Anna 
Drake, incorporated herein by reference and designated as Exhibit 
2. The matter of the debts listed by the respondent in his 
bankruptcy schedule, and the decision as to any deference to be 
given to appellant is not a moot point, only one which the trial 
court refused to decide. The trial court'., vrut:<, u carried 
out, would rob appellant of be!" sh<...re of che equity in the home, 
to satisfy the separate and individual debts of respondent. 
22. 
(B) 
IT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION FDR THE 
TRIAL COURT 'ID FAIL 'ID REcxx;NIZE APPELIANT' S 
INI'EREST IN THE REAL PROPERTY AND FAILING 'ID 
GFANT A HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION IN HER FAVOR. 
As previously stated, the trial court's decision to give 
sole possession, title and ownership of the real property of the 
parties to the respondent, resulted in the appellant being unable 
to file a hanestead exemption with the Federal Bankruptcy Court. 
The Bankruptcy Court refused to recognize any interest in the 
appellant, due to the fact that title was in the respondent's 
name solely. The only recourse which appellant had was through 
the trial court, which refused to grant her any relief. While 
appellant had requested that relief, and filed a M:ition and 
Statement of Points and Authorities relevant to the hanestead 
exemption, the court refused, time and again, to address the 
issue, until the last hearing in February, 1983, at which time 
the trial court stated that no homestead exemption 'M:luld be 
awarded. Again, this effectively precludes the appellant frcrn 
receiving any proceeds from the sale of the real property of the 
parties, despite the fact that appellant's funds brought into the 
marriage were used for the dov.n paymrnt on the home, despite the 
fact that the respondent, on March 9, 1981, was ordered by the 
court, to complete payment of principal, interest, tax ci11J 
insurance on the residence, and failed to do so, resulting in the 
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property going into the bankruptcy court, and despite the fact 
that respondent refused to canply with appellant's Request for 
Production of !)'.Jcunents dated January 7, 1982, requesting 
docunentation of said debts, and respondent's refusal to answer 
appellant's Interrogatories with regard to said debts sul:mitted 
to respondent on October 21, 1982. Sec.78-23-3 (5 of the Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, as amended) provides as follows: 
When a hanestead is conveyed by the owner of a 
property, the conveyance shall not subject property 
to any liens to which it wuld not be subject in the 
hands of the owners; and proceeds of any sale, to the 
amount of the exanption existing at the time of the 
sale, shall be exempt fran levy, execution, or other 
process for one year after the receipt of the proceeds 
by the person entitled to the exanption. 
The appellant, in the instant case, was entitled to an 
exemption, and it was an abuse of the trial court's discretion to 
refuse her the same, after it had taken the property out of her 
name and out of her hands. 
(C) 
THE TRIAL CDURT MISUNDERSTOOD OR MIS-
APPLIED THE IAW WI IB REGARD ID THE REAL 
PffiPERTY OWNED IN JOINT TENANCY BY THE 
PARTIES, ID THE SUBSTANTIAL PREJUDICE 
OF THE APPELIAl'JT. 
In the first trial on the matter and in subsequent hearings, 
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testimony was given and argument was made as to v.hich of the 
parties paid the dov.n payment on the real property. See, 
Transcript of Trial, Testimony of Respondent (10-1-81), pages 
19-21, Argunent of Counsel, Transcript of Hearing (2-4-83) page 
4, lines 11-17, and the custody evaluation, sub1Jitted by Ken 
Hansen, Assistant Director of the South Valley Social Services, 
dated January 4, 1983, Robert Race, page 3. Evidence existed 
v.hich revealed that it was appellant's funds, v.hich she brought 
into the marriage v.hich were used to make the dov.n payment on the 
hane of the parties, said funds corning from a settlement in a 
medical malpractice action brought after the death of her minor 
child, Sandra. However, the trial court stated, in no uncertain 
terms, "I am not concerned about who paid for the house in this 
sort of situation. These people were married for seven or eight 
years before the separation occurred." See, Transcript of Trial 
( 10-1-81) page 77, lines 18-19. While the Utah Supreme Court has 
recognized that a trial court may take many factors into 
consideration in the division of property in a marital 
dissolution, this Court has repeatedly recognized that twu 
important factors to consider are, what each party has given up 
for the marriage, and v.hat money or property each party brings 
into the marriage, particularly in cases such as this, v.here the 
marriage was of relatively short duration. See, Turner v. 
Turner, 649 P.2d 6, (Ut. ,1982); Mc[bnald v. Mcl:bnald, 236 P.2d 
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1066 (Ut., 1951). The tinpact upon the appellant of this judicial 
misapplication and misunderstanding of the law is substantial. 
This factor, as well as the trial court's misunderstanding of the 
hanestead exemption in the bankruptcy court, and its failure to 
consider what debts were being discharged in the Bankruptcy 
Court, reduced the resulting equity, if any, with which the 
parties v.uuld have to divide; the inequitable result being that 
the appellant received absolutely nothing from the sale of the 
residence of the parties, notwithstanding the important monetary 
contribution which she made to..ard the purchase of the property, 
and notwithstanding the fact that the bankruptcy was initiated 
and pursued solely by the respondent. 
(D) 
THE EVIDENCE IN THE INSTANT CASE INDICATES 
1HAT THE PROPERTY SITI'LfrlENT WAS INEQUITABIE, 
AND THAT IBERE WAS A POSSIBILI1Y OF FRAUD 
00 TilE APPELIANT AND TilE OOURr, AND TiiAT 
IT WAS AN ABUSE OF JUDICIAL DISCRErION FDR 
THE TRIAL COURT TO FAIL TO REax;NI ZE THE 
POSSIBIE FRAUD AND INEQUITIES. 
The trial court was put on notice early in the divorce 
proceedings that there was a major issue to be addressed with 
regard to the creditors listed in the respondent's Chapter XIII 
Bankruptcy, and whether they were actually marital debts, or 
whether respondent had been reimbursed for those debts. The 
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respondent testified in court that the debts listed on his 
financial statenent, INhich he subnitted to the court, and that 
the creditors listed on his Chapter XIII schedules were 
identical. See Transcript of hearing (10-1-81) page 63, lines 
13-16. A review of those docunents and appellant's statement of 
points and authorities relevant to the hanestead exenption, 
reveals that there was a major discrepancy, in that several 
creditors are listed on the Chapter XIII schedule INhich were not 
listed on the financial statement submitted by the respondent. 
This, coupled with the failure of the trial court to consider the 
monies INhich went to the purchase of the real property, denied 
the appellant a judg}llent based on accurate information and full 
disclosure relative to the merits of her position. TI1is 
possibility of fraud and this misapplication of law thwarted the 
process of justice in the instant case, and in fairness and good 
conscience, the judg}llent should not stand. See, Boyce v. Boyce, 
609 P. 2d 928 Utah (1980) ,in INhich the court found that the 
possibility of fraud and the inopportlll1ity on the part of the 
appellant to evaluate the information concerning the defendant's 
financial status was "inequitable and an affront to our judicial 
system," the court concluding that the trial judge had abused his 
discretion in failing to grant appellant's motion to set aside 
the judg}llent. Ibid. ,at p.930. 
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(E) 
TilE DIVORCE DECREE AND SUPPLEMENTAL 
DECREE OF DIVORCE, AND lliE PROPERTY 
SITI'I..E1'IENT CONTAINED IBEREIN IS INEQUIT-
ABLE AND PUNISHES lliE APPELIANI'. 
The Utah Supreme O:mrt requires that the trial court make an 
equitable disposition of marital property, "so that the parties 
may readjust their lives to the new situation as well as 
possible." See Turner v. Turner, 649 P.2d 6, (Utah Code 
Armotated, Sec.30-3-5 (1953, as amended). Due to the likelihood 
of fraud on the appellant and the court, the failure on the part 
of the trial court to allow appellant discovery of the 
respondent's creditors, and the other issues which appellant has 
previously discussed, the appellant was dealt an inequitable 
settlement in a proceeding whose nature is equity. The time span 
of the divorce action resulted in changes which had to be 
reconsidered by the trial judge in order to make a final order on 
each of the attendant divorce issues. The piecerneal 
decision-making which occurred in this case resulted in 
confusion, inequities, and a failure to account for those 
on-going changes, in particular, the status of the real property 
and the respondent's bankruptcy proceeding. 
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The appellant submits that the trial court's property 
distribution was improperly influenced by the trial court's 
hostility toward the appellant. Due to the reason aforementioned 
and appellant's fears with regard to her children's safety, the 
appellant was not available at the time of the first trial on the 
matter. She did, lvwever, appear before the court, first on 
August 12, 1982, and several times thereafter. At various times 
during the proceedings the trial court expressed its discontent 
with the appellant. See Transcript of Hearing (2-26-82), pages 
87-90, in which the trial court, after being appraised of the 
respondent's incestuous relations, and the possibility of other 
incestu:>us acts, threatened the appellant with the prospect of 
his awarding custody of the children to the respondent. This 
attitude came about due to appellant's reluctance to allow 
visitation between the minor children and the respondent. This 
judicial attitude seaned to carry over into the questions 
concerning the division of property and division of the equity 
fran the sale of the real property. The trial court even refused 
appellant's request that her maiden name be restored. See, 
Transcript of Hearing (2-26-82) p.96 lines 6-14. 
In Reed v. Reed, 594 P.2d 871 (Utah 1979), this Court held 
that while the trial court may exercise broad discretion and 
consider many factors in making a property distribution, the 
purpose of the settlanent should not be to punish the cdrties. 
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See, also, English v. English, 565 P.2d 400 (Utah 1977)and !iilrn 
v. Wilson, 296 P.2d 977 (Utah 1956). In the instant case, the 
appellant's property settlement is highly inequitable, and serves 
to punish the appellant rather than allow her to readjust her 
life to the new situation. 
Point II. 
TifE DF.cISION OF TifE TRIAL COURT WITH 
REGARD ID VISITATION AND CHILD SUPPORT, 
IS NOT IN TifE BEST INTEREST OF TifE CHILDREN, 
AND CONSTITUTES AN ABIBE OF DISCRETION. 
(A) 
1HE TRIAL COURT ABIBED ITS DISCRETION 
IN MAKING TifE RESPONDENT'S CHILD 
SUPPORT OBUGATIONS CDNTINGENT UPON 
HIS VISITATION WITH TifE MINOR CHILDREN. 
It has often been expressed by this Court and the 
Legislature that in child support and visitation matters the 
trial court must consider the best interest of the children. 
"The right of a child to support is a paramount right which it 
possesses quite apart from any consideration relating to the 
conduct of the parties." Earl v. Earl, 17 Utah 2d 156, 406 P.2d 
302 (1965), at 303; Utah Code Annotated, Sec. 30-3-10 (1953, as 
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amended). Utah law also provides that "every man shall support 
his child." Utah Code Annotated, Sec. 78-43-3 (1953, as 
amended). This statute is unqualified and requires support 
regardless of whether or not the non-custodial parent is 
exercising visitation with the children. 
While it is true that this court has allowed support 
payments be conditioned upon visitation, it has done so only with 
reluctance. See, Despain v. Despain, 610 P.2d 1302 (Utah, 1980). 
Appellant sulxnits that such an order is appropriate only in 
instances in which the custodial parent is purposely and 
unreasonably withholding visitation and is independently wealthy 
and able to support the children without assistance. Such are 
not the circunstances of the instant case. The parties' children 
have not received support fran the respondent since August 1, 
1981, even when specifically ordered by the court. The record 
reflects that after the appellant returned ID Utah, she attenpted 
to allow visitation on a supervised basis, which visitation was 
withdrawn voluntarily by the respondent. See, custody evaluation 
of Ken Hansen, Assistant Director, South Valley Social Services, 
Race v. Race, p.4. 
Far from being in the best interests of the minor children 
to this action, the orders of the trial court which condition the 
appellant's receipt of any child support upon the respondent 
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visiting with the minor children of the parties, are damaging and 
act as punishment. Simultaneously, the trial court ordered that 
the appellant's judg)llent for child support arrearages in the sum 
of $1,666.67 be stayed and execution on the same be stayed until 
visitation was established between respondent and the minor 
children, Sharon and Jeffrey. The needs of the children being 
the primary concern, ordering support conditioned on visitatiai, 
and staying execution on previously-awarded judgments is counter 
to the best interests of the children and in direct contradiction 
of both legislative and judicial intent. 
(B) 
THE TRIAL CDURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 
IN ORDERING TIIAT VISITATICN BE ESTABLISHED 
BITWEEN THE RESroNDENT AND 'lliE MINOR Q-IILDREN 
OF 'lliE PARTIES AS sro-i AS rosSIBLE, AND 
ORDERING PRIWRY Q-IILDREN'S HOSPITAL ID 
INTEGRATE THE RESPONDENT IN1D THERAPY OF 
THE MINOR Q-IILDREN. 
At the time when the trial court entered its final order on 
February 4, 1983, the court had in its possession a child custody 
evaluation which had been accomplished and sul:xnitted by the 
Division of Fanily Services for the state of Utah. Within said 
evaluation, the evaluators recommended that the children not be 
allowed to visit the respondent in the near future, giving their 
observations and basis for the recommendations within said 
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report. The trial court was aware, also, that the respondent had 
been charged and served a tenn of imprisornnent for the offense of 
incest with his minor daughter, Tamara, and that there was a 
possibility of other incestuous acts on the part of respondent 
with the minor child, Sharon. In addition, prior to the first 
trial on the matter, in chambers, the trial court was tendered 
Affidavits and reports of events and discussions involving the 
minor children of the parties, which had been prepared and 
sul::mitted by persons living out of the state of Utah, and 
unavailable for trial. as previously discussed in the 
Statenent of Facts, the court found these Affidavits and reports 
to be hearsay and refused their admission. 
Due to the highly equitable nature of proceedings involving 
minor children, the Utah Supreme Court has stated that the trial 
court is granted much more latitude in the adnission of evidence 
in such proceedings. See, State in the Interest of K.D.S.
1 
578 P .2d 9 (Utah 19 78). In addition, while the pertinent 
statute is within the chapter of Juvenile Courts, Sec. 
78-3(a)-35, certainly indicates a legislative intent with regard 
to the admission of evidence in proceedings involving children. 
That section states: 
"For the purpose of detennining proper dis-
position of the child, and for the purpose of 
establishing the fact of neglect or dtependency, 
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written reports and other material relating to the 
child's mental, physical and social history and con-
dition, may be received in evidence, and may be 
considered by court along with the other 
evidence ••• 
The affidavits which the trial court found to be 
inadmissible, appellant subnits. would have been valuable to the 
trial court on the issue of custody and visitation. 
Nevertheless, after considering all of the evidence, and without 
personally observing the minor children. the trial court ordered 
that the minor children of the parties, Jeffrey and Sharon, 
continue with therapy through Primary Children's Hospital, and 
that said hospital should integrate the respondent into the 
children's rherapy when the circunstances were deemed appropriate 
in the opinion of the professionals. There, the court indicated 
a number of times its desire that visitation be established as 
soon as possible. This order is in direct contradiction to the 
recCJ!IIlTiendations made by Utah Social Services in the custody 
evaluation, the history of the respondent, and the information 
which the trial court had before it. The foregoing facts, 
together with the apparent reluctance of the trial court to 
confront the incest issue, and its physical as well as 
psychological effect on the minor children of the parties, 
resulted in an order which does not serve the best interests of 
the minor children, Jeffrey and Sharon, and is an abuse of 
discretion. 
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Point Ill. 
THE TRIAL CXJURI' ABUSED ITS DISCRF.:TION IN 
All.OWING THE CXJNTEMPT OF THE APPELIJ\NT 
'ID REMA.IN IN THE CXJURI' RECXJRD. 
As evidenced through:mt the transcripts of the various 
trials and hearings in the above matter, the trial court was 
disgruntled with the appellant, and the appellant's actions. 
Adnittedly, it have been in the best interests of the 
appellant, had she appeared personally at the first trial in this 
matter. However, the protection of her children and her fears of 
injury to them were paramount at that time. With the confirmed 
evidence of incest before the court, and the possibility of other 
incestuous acts, the court stated " •• she certainly has been 
totally uncooperative, and she is still in trouble with this 
court and going to be in further trouble if we don't get this 
thing resolved and the court orders [with regard to visitation] 
canplied with." See, Transcript of Hearing (2-26-82) page 90, 
lines 10-13. The court further stating, "she may have to sit out 
ten days in jail to find out what that contempt of court means." 
See, Transcript of Trial (2-26-82) page 91, lines 3-4. And, with 
no evidence before the court, the trial court made 
unsubstantiated statenents with regard to the appellant poisoning 
the minor child's mind with regard to her father. See, 
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Transcript of Trial (2-26-82) page 90, lines 21-25. As stated 
earlier, the court continually threatened the appellant with the 
statenent that if she did not cooperate with regard to 
visitation, he wuld give custody of the minor children to the 
respondent. See, Transcript of Hearing (2-26-82) pages 87-89. 
After the trial court found the appellant in contempt, the 
appellant appeared before the trial court m.unerous times and 
attempted to establish supervised visitation between the children 
and respondent, which was voluntarily stopped by the respondent. 
'Ihese acts, as well as the appellant's understandable parental 
concern, certainly purged appellant of any earlier contenpt of 
court. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion , the property settlement in the instant case 
is wholly inequitable, based upon a misapplication of the law of 
marital property settlement, and a total ignorance as to the 
respondent's financial status, debts, and bankruptcy proceeding. 
Due to the possible fraud on the part of the respondent, the 
piecemeal decision-making, and the failure to account for ongoing 
changes in the status of the real property of the parties and the 
respondent's bankruptcy proceeding, the appellant has been 
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prejudiced, substantially and llllfairly. 
The trial court's final orders with regard to the issues of 
child support and visitation are contraindicated by all of the 
evidence presented to the court. Due to that evidence of incest, 
the respondent's vollllltary cessation of visitation, and the needs 
of the minor children, the orders linking child support to 
visitation and ordering visitation as soon as possible are not in 
the best interests of the minor children, and, therefore, an 
abuse of discretion. 
In addition, to allow the contempt of the appellant to 
ranain in the court record, after numerous atternpts on her part 
to purge herself of that court order, and after the court was 
presented with substantial justification for the acts of the 
appellant in her failure to appear before the trial court with 
the minor children, punishes the appellant, and is an abuse of 
discretion. 
While the trial court is presented with a difficult and 
disturbing decision in any contested divorce dissolution, it is 
an abuse of discretion for the trial court, in the instant case, 
to fail to recognize the incest present in this m2tter, and its 
attendant affects upon the children and the parties, it is an 
abuse of discretion to fail to recognize whcit pruperty the 
parties brought li1to the marriage .md v.hu omtc ibulc'<i whdl tu Lhc• 
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purchase of the real property of the parties; it is an abuse of 
discretion to make an award of property or division of equity in 
real property when there is no knowledge as to what debts are 
being paid from the proceeds of the sale of the home of the 
parties; and it is an abuse of discretion to fail to grant child 
support to the minor children of the parties when it is the acts 
of the respondent which initially created the problans and 
dilenrna confronting the appellant and the minor children. 
The foregoing argunents presented by appellant and the 
Transcript on file herein, demonstrate that the appellant is 
entitled to a reversal of the judgment below and a determination 
of the attendant issues. If this Court fails to act in 
appellant's favor, she will be precluded fran any money award, 
deference, or exemption from the sale of the real property of the 
parties and she will be precluded fran receiving child support 
from the respondent. The 101-.er court orders, if upheld, will 
serve to satisfy the separate and individual debts, needs and 
=issions of the respondent while serving to punish the minor 
children and the appellant. 
KELLIE F. WillIAMS 
Attorney for Appellant 
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KELLIE F. WULIAMS 
Attorney for Petitioner 
SUSAN RACE HUNTER 
CORPORON & WIILIAMS 
142 East 200 South, Ste 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 328-1162 
IN 1HE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT, FOR 1HE 
DISTRICT OF IJI'AH, CENfRAL DIVISION. 
IN 1HE MATIER OF 
ROBERT WAYNE RACE. 
STATE OF IJI'AH 
COUNTY OF SALT I.ARE 
SS, 
AFFIDAVIT OF TRUSTEE, 
ANNA DRAKE. 
00. 81-01923 
CDME.S N'.)W, ANNA DRAKE, as Trustee in Bankruptcy, and de[X)ses and 
states as follows: 
1. That she has been and is the Trustee in Bankruptcy in the 
above-entitled matter. 
2. That she will not disburse any funds in this case until the 
Bankrupt's divorce appeal, Case No.19146, has been detemined by the 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
DATED this JJ..:!±___day of July, 1983. 
ANNA DRAKE 
£xJ;16d 2 p I 
40 
SUBSC1UBED AND SWORN to before me this __d_ day of July, 1983. 
My COlllllission Expires: 
NOTARY PUBLIC, Residing in 
Salt Lake County, Utah. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
MAILED a copy of the foregoing APPEUJ..NI''S BRIEF as follows: 
J:IMI MITSUNAGA, ESQ. 
731 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
LYNN P . HEWARD 
Fonner Attorney for 
Plaintiff and Appellant 
1174 East 2700 South 
84021 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
this 10th day of Novenber, 1983. 
,-------· 
6u l Ci !; / dt. [_, __ =---:, 
IE F. Will :u;i;lS ... 
Attorney for Appellant 
